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NOTES
THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AFFAIR:
A FAILURE IN JUDICIAL PURSUASION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic narrowly
avoided warfare in December 1978 over three islands at the southern tip of South America.' These islands lie in the vicinity of the
Beagle Channel, which runs to the south of Tierra del Fuego. 2 The
islands are part of a longstanding border controversy3 that erupted
anew after reports of undersea oil4 and minerals' located in the
area. The recent trend toward acceptance of the two-hundred mile
limit for national jurisdiction over adjacent seabed' makes the
ownership of the islands crucial to the exploitation of these resources.
After the failure of repeated attempts to settle the controversy
through bilateral negotiations,7 the parties agreed in 1971 to arbitrate the dispute. A Compromiso set forth the issue to be arbitrated.' Additionally, the Compromiso provided that the dispute
was to be arbitrated under the terms of the parties' 1902 Treaty of
1. THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 30, 1978, at 34; Statement by Argentine Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Worship, reprinted in Embassy of Argentine Republic,
Argentina-Chile: Some Background Documents 7-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Argentine Background Documents].
2. See map at Appendix, infra, taken from Embassy of Chile, ChileanArgentine Relations: The Beagle Channel Controversy plate 1 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Chilean Background Documents]. See also the map at 71 AM. J. INT'L
L. 733, 737 (1977).
3. 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 733, 734 (1977).
4. In April 1977, the Argentine government authorized companies to conduct
seismic studies for oil in the area. Wall St. J., April 14, 1977, at 15, col. 4. Oil
was first discovered off Argentina's south Atlantic coast in March, 1978. Id.,
March 28, 1978, at 17, col. 1. The Argentine government authorized offshore
drilling near Tierra del Fuego in April, 1978. Id., April 14, 1978, at 38, col. 5.
5. THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 30, 1978, at 34.
6. Id. at 35.
7. Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration, rendered to Her Britannic
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, Feb. 30, 1977, reprinted in 17
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 636 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Report].
8. Arbitration Agreement (or Compromiso), July 22, 1971 (Cmnd. 4781),
reprintedin 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 637 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Compromiso].
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Arbitration;' the decision, however, was not to be made solely by
the arbitrator named in that Treaty, the Government of the United
Kingdom. Instead, the United Kingdom was to select five members from the International Court of Justice"0 to serve as a Court
of Arbitration ("Court"), and the decision of that Court was to
become effective only upon ratification by the United Kingdom."
The Court was duly appointed and deliberated for nearly six
years. On February 18, 1977, the Court unanimously awarded all
three disputed islands to Chile. 2 The Court also fixed a nine
month period for the implementation of the decision, running from
the time the parties were notified of ratification. 3 The United
Kingdom ratified the decision on April 18, 1977,14 and the parties
5
were officially notified on May 2, 1977.

Argentina rejected the decision" and both parties made preparations for war. Thus the decision reached after six years of legal
proceedings failed to win the parties' voluntary compliance. An
examination of the decision may indicate whether its rejection by
Argentina was due to that country's intransigence or to defects in
the decision itself.
II. POST-AwARD

DEVELOPMENTS

A. Argentina's Declarationof Nullity
Although the Government of Chile accepted the Award immediately upon notification, 7 the Government of Argentina once again
proposed bilateral negotiations. 8 This proposal was rejected by
9. General Treaty of Arbitration, May 28, 1902, Argentina-Chile, 35 Martens
Nouveau Recueil 297 (2d ser. 1908).
10. Id. at arts. 1, 3.
11. Compromiso, supra note 8, arts. XII, XIII, at 640.
12. Decision of the Court of Arbitration, Feb. 30, 1977, reprinted in 17 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIAL 634, 643 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Decision].
13. Dispositif, id. at 674. The Court was empowered to set this time period
by Articles 1 and 2 of the Compromiso, supra note 8, at 640.
14. Declaration of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, April 18, 1977, reprinted

in 17

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

632 (1978).

15. See Official statement by the Government of Chile, reprinted in Chilean
Background Documents, supra note 2, at 111.
16. Argentine Republic, Declaration of Nullity, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 739 (1978) (unofficial translation) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of

Nullity].
17. Official Statement by the Government of Chile, reprinted in Chilean
Background Documents, supra note 2, at 111.
18.

Statement by Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, supra

note 1, at 7.
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Chile.19 On July 14, 1977, Chile declared maritime jurisdiction
reaching two hundred miles to the east of straight baselines drawn
between the easternmost points of the three islands." As the end
of the nine-month implementation period drew closer without any
sign of acceptance by Argentina, 2 the Presidents of the two coun-22
tries met on January 19, 1978, in an attempt to reach agreement.
The meeting was unsuccessful, and six days later Argentina announced its Declaration of Nullity.2 The Declaration held the
Award invalid as being contrary to international law. Argentina
once again proposed that the dispute be discussed in bilateral
negotiations.24
B. CardinalSamor$'s Mediation
Although Chile refused to agree to any discussion of questions
covered by the Award,21 it did agree on February 20, 1978, to con2
sult with Argentina in a series of three bilateral commissions.
Consultation came to an end in November of that year when the
second commission ended as a result of a failure to agree on the
scope of the issues to be discussed.2 After this breakdown, it was
19. Id.
20. Republic of Chile, Supreme Decree No. 416 at id.
21. Since both parties were notified on May 2, 1977, of ratification by the
United Kingdom, the nine month period ended on February 2, 1978. See text
accompanying note 13, supra.
22. Puerto Montt Act, Feb. 20, 1978, reprintedin Argentine Background Documents, supra note 1, at 1. See also THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 30, 1978, at 34.
23. "[T]he Government of the Republic of Argentina declares that, as an
effect of the manifest nullity of the decision of the Court of Arbitration and the
Award of Her Britannic Majesty, which is its consequence, it deems itself not
obliged to abide by it." Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 750.
24. "[T]he Argentine Government feels that the most suitable route for finding permanent and definitive solutions ... is to negotiate bilaterally the jurisdictional differences existing between the two countries ......

Argentine Republic,

Note to the Government of the Republic of Chile, Jan. 25, 1978, reprinted in 17
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 738-39 (1978) (unofficial translation).
25. [S]uch negotiations can never deal-as they have not dealt in the
past-with questions resolved by the decision of Her Britannic Majesty.
You are well aware of the fact that the Chilean government expressed its
complete acceptance of the decision of May 2, 1977, and has fully carried
it out.
Republic of Chile, Note to the Government of the Argentine Republic, Jan. 26,
1978, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATEmLS 750, 751 (1978) (unofficial translation).
26. Puerto Montt Act, supra note 22.
27. Second Joint Commission of the Puerto Montt Act, Press Release,
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suggested that Juan Carlos, King of Spain, undertake mediation,
but he refused.s At the time of his refusal, each country's armed
forces were actively preparing for war."9 In December 1978, 100,000
Argentine and 45,000 Chilean troops faced each other along the
border, and the navies of both countries were stationed in the
vicinity of the disputed islands." As war looked imminent, the
Pope offered and the parties accepted Cardinal Antonio Samor6 as
a peace envoy. 3' Three weeks later, on January 8, 1979, Cardinal
"Samor6 succeeded in persuading the parties to sign an agreement.
The agreement provided for a pullback of military forces and a
reopening of negotiations under a formula that would allow Chile
to keep possession of the disputed islands but would establish a
"demilitarized binational zone" over the Channel itself.32 If this
formula is implemented, the decision of the Court of Arbitration
will become a nullity.3
The apparent success of Cardinal Samor6 stands in sharp contrast to the failure of the Court of Arbitration to resolve the dispute
after six years of legal proceedings. Since all five members of the
Court also sat for the International Court of Justice,3 4 it is even
more remarkable that they were unable to produce an effective
decision.

III.

DECISION OF THE COURT

A.

Argentina's Arguments

The Compromiso empowered the Court of Arbitration to determine "in accordance with the principles of international law"35 the
boundary between Argentina and Chile within an area known as
reprinted in Argentine Background Documents, supra note 1, at 19. According to
Chile, the Argentine negotiators insisted that the subject matter of the negotiations include disputes over the territory within the area covered by the Award.
The Chilean negotiators refused to agree. Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Statement of Aug. 16, 1978 (unofficial translation).

28.

THE ECONOMIST,

Dec. 30, 1978, at 35.

29. Id. at 34.

30.

THE ECONOMIST,

Jan. 13, 1979, at 54.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. "[D]enouncement by one party and acquiesence by the other" is an
accepted ground for invalidity of treaties in international law. 5 G. HACKWORT,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (1943).
34. Letter by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (British president of the Court of Arbitration), reprinted in THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 1979, at 4.
35. Compromiso, supra note 8, art. I, para. 7, at 639.
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"the hammer. 3' 6 This area contains the three disputed islands of

Picton, Nueva, and Lennox (the PNL group)." At the time of the
The
dispute, about twenty Chileans inhabited the three islands.
38
area also includes various uninhabited smaller islands.
Although no boundary line had ever been drawn,39 the general
terms of the 1881 Treaty of Delimitation (Treaty) arguably covered
the area." Article 3 of that Treaty provides:
In Tierra del Fuego a line shall be drawn, which starting from the
point called Cape Espiritu Santo, in parallel 52 * 40', shall be prolonged to the south along the meridian 68 0 34' west of Greenwich
until it touches Beagle Channel. Tierra del Fuego, divided in this
manner, shall be Chilean on the western side and Argentine on the
eastern. As for the islands, to the Argentine Republic shall belong
Staten Island, the small islands next to it, and the other islands
there may be on the Atlantic to the east of Tierra del Fuego and of
the eastern coast of Patagonia; and to Chile shall belong all the
islands to the south of Beagle Channel up to Cape Horn, and those
there may be to the west of Tierra del Fuego.4
Argentina argued that the reference to islands "on the Atlantic"
included the PNL group." Argentina admitted that the islands
were neither "east of Tierra del Fuego" nor east of "the eastern
coast of Patagonia," but insisted that the islands were nonetheless
on the eastern fringes of the area in question.4 3 Argentina also
pointed out that the PNL group had to be included in the phrase
"other islands there may be" in order for the language to have any
useful effect, since there were no other islands in that area which
were not already covered by other Treaty language.
36. Id. at art. I, para. 4, at 638; Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 1,
at 643, and Map A, at 676. The parties were unable to agree on the wording of
the question to be submitted to arbitration, and therefore each submitted a
different question. The Court, however, held that both questions amounted "to
much the same thing." Id. at 644.
37. Arbiration Decision, supra note 12, para. 3, at 644.
38. Note, The Beagle Channel Affair, 71 Am.J. IN''L L. 733, 734 (1977).
39. Id.
40. Treaty of Delimitation, July 23, 1881, Argentina-Chile, 12 Martens Nouveau Recueil 491 (2d ser. 1887), reprintedin 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 646 (1978).
41. Treaty of Delimitation, supra note 40, art. 3, at 647.
42. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 55, at 656.
43. Id. para. 60, at 658.
44. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 745-46. Argentina also argued
that the Spanish text, "que haya sobre el Atlantico," must be read to refer to such
islands not in the conditional ("such as there may be") but in the declarative
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Finally Argentina argued that the entire Treaty, including Article 3, should be read in conjunction with an underlying "Oceanic"
principle which dictated that islands lying on the Atlantic side of
the area belonged to Argentina.45 Argentina stated that it gave up
its claim to the Straits of Magellan in 1881 in return for Chile's
application of the Oceanic or Atlantic/Pacific principle to the areas
in dispute." Further, Argentina argued that the principle is derived from the doctrine of uti possedetisjuris of 1810.11 This doctrine holds that all territory in Spanish America was governed by
one or the other of the administrative subdivisions of Spanish rule,
and that such territory vested in the newly independent states that
replaced the various Spanish administrative subdivisions." In accordance with this doctrine, Argentina had emphasized claims to
territory from the Atlantic coast to the peaks of the Andes since
1810 whereas Chile had emphasized claims from the peaks to the
Pacific. This course of conduct, according to Argentina, gave rise
to the principle that Argentina should be an Atlantic power and
Chile a Pacific one." The application of this principle to the areas
in dispute in 1881 was illustrated by the attribution to Argentina
of the Atlantic, or eastern, half of Tierra del Fuego and the attribution to Chile of the Pacific or western half. Likewise, with regard
to smaller islands south of Tierra del Fuego, the Treaty gave Argentina the Atlantic islands and Chile the Pacific ones. Since the
PNL group was on the Atlantic side, it was attributed to Argentina.50
As further evidence of the existence of this Atlantic-Pacific principle, Argentina cited the following language from a Protocol
signed in 1893:51

[A]ccording to the spirit of the Boundary Treaty [of 1881], the
Argentine Republic retains her dominion and sovereignty over all
the territory that extends from the East of the principle chain of the
Andes as far as the Atlantic coasts, just as, the Republic of Chile
over the Western territory as far as the Pacific coasts; it being un("such as are"). Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 55, at 647, para. 61,
at 658. The Argentine translation is set out at 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1977).
45. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 74, at 664.
46. Id. para. 11, at 646.
47. Id. para. 10, at 645.
48. Id.
49. Id. para. 11, at 645.
50. Id. para. 28, at 651.
51. Protocol, May 1, 1893, Argentina-Chile, Chilean Annex 62, reprinted in
17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 664 (1978).
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derstood that, by the provisions of that Treaty, the sovereignty of
each state over the respective coastlines is absolute, in such a manner that Chile cannot lay claim to any point towards the Atlantic,
just as the Argentine Republic can lay no claim to any toward the
Pacific.
52
According to Argentina, this language when read in conjunction
with Article 3 of the 1881 Treaty revealed the parties' intention to
split the islands south of Tierra del Fuego along the Cape Horn
meridian, which geographically divides the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans.13 Argentina argued that the division of Tierra del Fuego
along a line to the west of the meridian and the failure to divide
Navarino island occurred because the parties intended that only
islands lying wholly to the west or east of the meridian could lie
completely in separate jurisdictions.54

B.

Chile's Arguments

Chile argued that the Treaty did not illustrate the application
of an oceanic principle, but rather embodied a trade-off of Chile's
claims to Patagonia in return for Argentina's recognition of Chilean dominion over the Straits of Magellan. As a consequence of
this trade-off, Chile received the Strait and all territory south of
it under Article 2, except as specifically provided otherwise by
Article 3.55 Furthermore, in light of the literal meaning of the words
and the Patagonia/Magellan trade-off, the interpretation of the
islands clause of Article 3 need not be strained. Chile pointed out
that the clause speaks of islands "on the Atlantic, to the east of

52. Id. art. 2.
53. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 60, at 658.
54. Id.
55. Id. para. 27, at 651, para. 92 at 669. Article 2 provides:
In the southern part of the Continent, and to the north of the Straits of
Magellan, the boundary between the two countries shall be a line which,
starting from Point Dungeness, shall be prolonged by land as far as Monte
Dinera; from this point it shall continue to the west, following the greatest
altitudes of the range of hillocks existing there, until it touches the hill-top
of Mount Aymond. From this point the line shall be prolonged up to the
intersection of the 70th meridian with the 52nd parallel of latitude, and
thence it shall continue to the west coinciding with this latter parallel, as
far as the divortia aquarum of the Andes. The territories to the north of such
a line shall belong to the Argentine Republic, and to Chile those extending
to the south of it, without prejudice to what is provided in Article III,
respecting Tierra del Fuego and adjacent islands.
Id. para. 15, at 647.
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Tierra del Fuego" (emphasis added), and argued that the word
"Atlantic" did not refer to the Atlantic/Pacific (or oceanic) principle." Finally, Chile argued that even if the general language of
Article 2 did not describe Chilean dominion of the islands, the
following specific language of Article 3 awarded such dominion:
"to Chile shall belong all the islands to the south of the Beagle
Channel . ...

-

C.

The Court's Conclusion

The Court applied the rules of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties in interpreting the Treaty between Chile and Argentina. 8 Under those rules, which stress the subjective intent of
the parties, 5 the Court considered the text, the travaux
pr~paiatoires, and the historical context of the 1881 Treaty. In
interpreting the text, the Court found that both the title "tratado
de Limites" (Boundary Treaty) and the Preamble revealed an intent to reach a complete, permanent, and definite settlement of
boundary questions." With regard to the travaux pr6paratoires,
the Court considered the Argentine proposals, known as the "Bases
of 1876," which started the negotiations that led to the Treaty.'
The Court also examined the course of the negotiations and attempted to put them into historical context.62 On the basis of these
considerations, the Court concluded that the Treaty must be interpreted in such a way that would allocate all territory in dispute at
the time of the Treaty. 3 Furthermore, the Court rejected the Argentine view that the Treaty was a trade-off of Argentine interest
in controlling the Straits of Magellan for the Chilean recognition
of the oceanic principle. The Court found that the wording of Article 1, which attributed Patagonia to Argentina, was inconsistent
56. Id. para. 62, at 659.
57. Id. para. 80, at 665; 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 735-36 (1977). Since the Beagle
Channel, according to Chile, ran in an east-west direction, dividing the Tierra del
Fuego on the north from the PNL group on the south, the PNL was indisputably
Chilean,
58. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 39/27 (1969); see also Arbitration Decision, supra note
12, para. 7, at 645.
59. Vienna Convention, supra note 58, arts. 31, 32, 33.
60. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, paras. 18, 19, at 648-49.
61. Id. para. 25, at 650.
62. Id. para. 14, at 646.
63. Treaty of Delimitation, supra note 40, Preamble; Arbitration Decision,
supra note 12, paras. 18, 19, at 648.
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with the Argentine view.6 The Court held that "it was the antithesis Patagonia/Magellan rather than the Magellan/Atlantic
which constituted the fundamental element of the Treaty settlement." Moreover, the language of the 1893 Protocol had to be
interpreted in light of the delineation of the Andes boundary6 and
could not serve as evidence of an all-prevailing "Atlantic" or
oceanic principle. Since no such principle could justify interpreting "on the Atlantic to the east of Tierra del Fuego" in Article 3
as meaning "on the eastern fringes of Tierra del Fuego,""6 the
Court rejected the Argentine argument for attribution of PNL
under Article 3.
In view of the Court's finding that the Treaty was intended to
attribute all disputed territory to one party or another, it would
appear that a rejection of the Argentine attribution would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the islands were attributed to
Chile. The Court, however, was not content with such a conclusion,69 and evaluated the Chilean attribution independently. The
Court first examined Chile's claim of a general attribution under
Article 2 and found it to be inconclusive." Consequently, the Court
explored Chile's claimed attribution under the following language
in Article 3: "To Chile shall belong all the islands to the south of
Beagle Channel up to Cape Horn." This language confronted the
Court with the difficult task of defining the course of the Channel
at its eastern end. The general course of the Channel is clear in the
narrow space between Navarino Island and Tierra del Fuego, but
when the coast of Navarino turns south the Channel ceases to be
self-evidently defined by geography. 71 The Channel's course had
not been discussed during the negotiations leading up to the
Treaty.7 2 If the Channel ran in an east-west line between PNL and
Tierra del Fuego, PNL would be south of the Channel and would
be attributed to Chile. Conversely, if the Channel turned with the
coast of Navarino and ran in a north-south line between that island
64. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 29, at 651.
65. Id. para. 31, at 651.
66. The Protocol was signed in an effort to speed the work of the experts
attempting to establish a boundary line along the highest points of the Andes
pursuant to the Treaty of 1881. Id., paras. 74, 75, at 664.
67. Id. para. 75, at 664.
68. Id. para. 79, at 665.
69. Id. para. 52, at 655.
70. Id. para. 49, at 654.
71. See map, infra, at Appendix.
72. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 87, at 666-67.
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and PNL, then the Treaty term "south of' would have no meaning
and another provision of the Treaty would have to cover the PNL
group.73 Since the Treaty had to be interpreted to allocate the
islands to one party and no other Treaty provisions covered the
PNL, the Court concluded that the Channel, at least for Treaty
purposes, ran in an east-west line between PNL and Tierra del
Fuego.7 4 The Court observed that the clause "to the south of Beagle
Channel" lacked meaning when applied to a channel running
north-south. Therefore, the Court held that the Treaty attributed
the islands to Chile, and drew a boundary line in accordance with
that finding." The Court noted that certain "confirmatory or corroborative incidents and materials," including the post-Treaty
conduct of the parties, the cartography of both sides, and acts of
jurisdiction, confirmed its conclusion." The Court emphasized
that these materials were merely confirmatory, however, and
formed no part of the basis for the decision.77
IV.

A.

ARGENTINA'S REJECTION OF THE DECISION

Legal and PoliticalSufficiency Distinguished

Argentina rejected the decision of the Court despite its commitment to be legally bound." In its Declaration of Nullity, Argentina
listed the following grounds for invalidation of the Award under
international law: "(A) Distortion of Argentine Theses . . . (B)

Opinion on disputed questions that had not been submitted to
arbitration . . . (C) Contradictions in the reasoning of the Court
(D) Interpretation Defects. . . (E) Geographical and historical errors. . . (F) Imbalance in the evaluation of the argumentation and evidence submitted by each Party . . . .- Since the
Court's decision was made pursuant to the 1902 Arbitration

73. Id. para. 93, at 669.
74. Id. para. 96, at 670, para. 99, at 671; 71 Ati. J. INr'L L. 738 (1977).
75. Dispositif, id. See map at Appendix, infra. A more detailed depiction of
the line as drawn by the Court can be found in Chilean Background Documents,
supra note 2, at plate 2.
76. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, at 634 n.1; 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 739
(1977).
77. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 163, at 634 n.1.
78. "The Award shall be legally binding upon both the Parties and there shall
be no appeal from it, except as provided in Article XfII of the Treaty." Compromiso, supra note 8, art. XIV, at 640. Article XH refers to the discretionary power
given Her Britannic Majesty to ratify the Court's decision and so constitute it the
Award. Id.
79. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 739.
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Treaty, Argentina's grounds for rejecting the Award do not violate
international law if they follow the rules regarding the invalidation
of treaties. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes the following grounds for invalidating treaties: mistake,
fraud, corruption or coercion of a representative of a state, and
compulsion under threat of force. 5 None of the Argentine arguments for rejection included any of these grounds.
It is, however, widely accepted that the decision of an international tribunal may be nullified on less stringent grounds.8 ' Although their specific nature is subject to wide disagreement, the
grounds are as follows: "(1) excess of power,8 2 (2) corruption of a
member of the tribunal, or (3) a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure." ' The first ground, a tribunal exceeding
its power by ruling beyond the scope of or contrary to the rules of
the compromise submitted by the parties, is the most often cited
ground in cases of non-compliance.8 4 Argentina's Declaration of
Nullity contains two examples of this first ground: opinions on
questions not submitted and interpretation defects. There is some
question whether a claim of nullity based on interpretation defects
automatically entitles a party to a review of the arbitral award on
the merits. This appears to have been the practice in Latin America,"' but is not generally accepted elsewhere. 8 Furthermore, the
language in the Compromiso providing that there shall be no appeal militates against the effectiveness of such an argument in this
case.8 7
Absent such an argument, only the ground of "opinions on ques80. Vienna Convention, supra note 58, reprintedin 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 89091 (1969).
81. Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral
Decisions, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1960).
82. "Exces de pouvoir" means acting beyond jurisdictional authority. Id.
83. Id. Excess 'of power is the most often cited ground.
84. Id.
85. See dissenting opinion of Judge U. Holguin in Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua), [1960] I.C.J. 192, 223-26. "In Latin America, strongly-felt territorial issues
have been the main sources of cases of non-compliance and claims of nullity."
Schachter, supranote 81, at 4-5. See also H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 545 n.118 (R. Tucker ed., 1966).
86. Claims of nullity are treated as "excuses" for non-performance rather than
as grounds for review of the decision. Schachter, supra note 81, at 4, 5. See also
Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain [1960] I.C.J.
192, 214; H. KELSEN, supra note 85, at 545-46.
87. Compromiso, supra note 8, art. XIV, at 640.
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tions not submitted" appears to have prima facie validity under
international law. This claim will be examined in more detail
below. None of the remaining Argentine arguments meet the accepted criteria for invalidity of treaties or nullity of arbitral
awards. The alleged distortion of Argentine theses merely illustrates the result of the risk of non-persuasion that must be borne
by any party to an arbitral proceeding. The advocates on each side
must make their respective legal positions clear. The objections
concerning logical contradictions and geographical and historical
errors involve the risk of non-persuasion. Such errors may contribute to a bad decision, but the parties bargained for a legal holding
and international law requires its acceptance. 8
Although the Argentine objections are insufficient to invalidate
the decision under international law, they may highlight weaknesses in the opinion that justify a political rejection. The Award,
like most decisions governed by international law, is not backed by
any effective physical sanction.89 The Award therefore depends
upon the parties' enlightened self-interest, fear of public opinion,
and fear of retaliation for implementation. The strength of these
motives is to some extent outside the control of the Court, but the

Court can affect them through the logic and moral force of its
decision.'

Even if a morally and logically defensible decision is

88. H. KELSEN, supra note 85, at 543-46.
89. "In the international field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the
last resort be enforced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than
the exception .... ." South West Africa Cases [1966] I.C.J. 6, 45. See also E.
DEUTSCH, AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAw 266-67 (1977); 1 S. ROSENNE, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 119-22, 125-26 (1965); 1 G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1940); P. BROWN, INTERNATIONAL

21 (1917). It is elementary that decisions of international tribunals are
often enforced by the parties themselves despite the absence of physical sanction.
See, e.g., Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. 116; Eastern
Greenland Case (Denmark v. Norway), [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53; Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46.
90. 1 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 89, at 12.
91. One noted jurist stated that:
[Tihe moral force of a judgment of decision will be at a maximum when
REALITIES

the following conditions are satisfied: . . .2) The judge has no direct or

indirect interest (even emotional) in the outcome of the case. 3) The judge
confines his decision to the controversy before him and attempts no regulation of the parties' relations going beyond that controversy .... 6) Each

disputant is given ample opportunity to present his case.
FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 706 (Temp. ed. 1949). Argentina's
ground B, opinion on questions not submitted, and ground F, imbalance, implicate conditions 3 and 6 above, respectively. Condition 2 above may be violated

L.
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reached, however, a failure to articulate clearly its grounds may
deprive the decision of the persuasiveness that is especially critical
in international adjudication.
B.

Distortion of Argentine Theses

The first ground alleged in the Declaration of Nullity,
"[d]istortion of Argentine theses,""2 is primarily a reference to the
dispute over the course of the Beagle Channel at its eastern end.
Argentina claimed it had never argued that the Channel ran in a
north-south direction between PNL and Navarino, but that the
Channel instead stopped short of PNL to the west of Picton. According to Argentina, the Court had incorrectly attributed the former argument93 to their government and then had concluded that
such an interpretation made the phrase "south of Beagle Channel"94 meaningless. 5 The Court reached this conclusion, however,
after taking note of and rejecting the Argentine thesis that the
Channel stopped short of PNL16 Argentina's short-Channel thesis,
according to the Court, would have left the islands unallocated
under the Treaty, which was "a result that certainly could never
have been intended" by the parties.
C.

Opinion on Questions not Submitted

Argentina claimed that the Court had "passe[d] judgment on
the status of" islands to the south of the hammer area. In dealing
by the presence of a British citizen on the Court. Britain and Argentina are parties
to a long-standing dispute over the Falkland Islands, which are in the Atlantic
to the east of PNL. 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 734 (1977).
92. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 740.
93. Id. at 741. See also the Court's description of a map submitted by Argentina which shows the Channel stopping short of PNL. Arbitration Decision, supra
note 12, para. 108, at 673. After the decision the Argentine Embassy distributed
a map that emphasized a Beagle Channel running to the west of the PNL group
between PNL and Navarino Island.
94. Treaty of Delimitation, supra note 40, art. 3, at 647.
95. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 80, at 665, para. 90 at 668-69,
para. 93 and 69, para. 96 at 670.
96. Id. para. 54, at 655.
97. Id. para. 81, at 665.
98. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 742. See Arbitration Decision,
supra note 12, para. 60, at 658. Argentina also claims that the Court passed on
matters beyond its competence when it declared Punta Dungeness, near the
Strait of Magellan, to be on the Atlantic. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16,
at 743. This claim is without merit because the boundaries in that region are
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with Argentina's Oceanic argument, the Court referred to islands
outside the hammer. The Court noted that division along the Cape
Horn meridian, which divides the Atlantic from the Pacific,
would cover the PNL group. It would also cover a number of other
islands not actually in dispute in the present proceedings, the title
to which it is not within the competence of the Court to pronounce
upon. Yet they must be named, because it is not otherwise possible
to understand the precise nature of the Argentine "Atlantic" contention, and what is meant by the claim that all islands fringing the
Cape Horn meridian on its eastern side were assigned to Argentina
under the Islands Clause [of Article 3].1
The Court then named and located the islands, saying in parenthesis that "all of them, as the Court understands it, [are] actually in Chilean physical possession."'"" This statement is obviously not the same as one passing judgment. Thus, Argentina's
claim that the Court exceeded its power is unfounded. Excess of
power is properly applicable only to those cases in which a Court
actually goes beyond the limits of its competence in making its
award. It does not apply to a mere passing remark."1
Even though the Court's reference to islands outside the hammer does not lead to nullity by reason of excess of power, there was
clearly no judicial necessity for making the statement. Argentine
sensitivity on this issue must have been apparent. Indeed, bias
appears to be the underlying Argentine objection to this statement.0' Thus, the Court weakened the moral force of its decision
by not carefully avoiding the appearance of prejudice.
D.

Contradictionsand Problems of Interpretation

The Court's unfortunate reference to islands outside the hammer occurred in its response to Argentina's contention that the
undisputed and the characterization of Punta Dungeness as being on the Atlantic
does not require any conclusion about the attribution of the area in dispute.
Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 24, at 649, para. 31, at 651.
99. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 60, at 658.

100. Id.
101. Excess of power was more properly relied upon by the United States in
rejecting the decision of the King of Holland in the Northeastern Boundary Dispute Arbitration of 1831. In that case the King of Holland was directed to choose
one of two boundary lines as correct, and instead he drew an intermediate line.
Schachter, supra note 81, at 3 n.9.
102. See Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 749.
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Islands Clause"0 3 had to refer either to PNL or nothing at all.', 4
Argentina claimed in its Declaration of Nullity that the Court's
conclusion that the clause does not cover PNL deprives the language of useful effect.' 5 This is an incorrect reading, however, since
the Court's interpretation simply permits the language to provide
certainty and completeness with regard to any islands within the
specified areas that might have been overlooked.' 8 This is a reasonable interpretation, especially in light of Chile's evidence concerning the existence of certain small islands lying east of Tierra
del Fuego and unnamed in the Treaty.107 Furthermore, the placement of the clause in Article 3 indicates that the drafters intended
to include islands to the east of Staten Island and Patagonia, but
not the area in which PNL lies.' 8
Argentina's basic objection to the Court's interpretation of the
Islands Clause is that the Court failed to incorporate an underlying
Oceanic principle.' 9 The Court held that "there is no real ground
for postulating the existence of an accepted 'Oceanic' principle
(ultimately deriving from the very uti possidetis which, as such,
the [1881] Treaty was intended to supersede) figuring as something that must a priorigovern the interpretation of the Treaty as
a whole."' 0 In other words, the Court determined that the travaux
preparatuires did not warrant an assumption of the Oceanic principle. The Court further stated that "[s]ince it has to be assumed
that the negotiators were neither ignorant of, nor indifferent to, the
geography of the region, it can only be supposed that they regarded
the Channel's course as too evident to need discussion or definition.""' In view of the Court's findings concerning the confusion
that existed among contemporary cartographers over the course of
the Channel," 2 this assumption is questionable. It would be more
103. "[T]o the Argentine Republic shall belong ... the other islands there
may be on the Atlantic to the east of Tierra del Fuego and of the eastern coast of
Patagonia ...

."

Treaty of Delimitation, supra note 40, art. 3.

104. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 60, at 658.
105. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 746.
106. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 61, at 658-59.
107. Id.
108. Id. para. 65, at 661.
109. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 745.
110. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 66, at 662. See also id., para.
22, at 649. With regard to the language of the 1893 Protocol, the Court said it was
"unable to give so wide and general a scope to a phrase that is so evidently set in
a particular context,-that of the Andes boundary .

111. Id. para. 87, at 667.
112. Id. para. 163, at 634 n.1.

"Id.,

para. 75, at 664.
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reasonable to assume that the negotiators agreed on specific attributions and an underlying Oceanic principle but did not examine
all of the details. This view is supported by the provision in the
1881 Treaty"' and the 1893 Protocol 1 ' that required experts to
more specifically delineate the boundary.
Although the Court's conclusion results from a defensible
method of treaty interpretation, 5 such a broad dismissal of the
Oceanic principle was not necessary to the Court's conclusion that
PNL was attributed to Chile. Since the "south of Beagle Channel"
phrase of Article 3, according to the Court, required attribution of
the islands specifically to Chile, the existence or non-existence of
a residual Oceanic principle could not affect the legal conclusion.
The declaration that no such principle exists, on the other hand,
dramatically affected the political acceptability of that legal conclusion. It needlessly antagonized the party whose voluntary compliance would be most difficult to secure. The Court either underestimated the symbolic importance of the principle or ignored
ways of using that symbolism to advantage."'
In addition to the argument that the Court ignored the Oceanic
principle, Argentina claims in her Declaration of Nullity that the
Court contradicted itself. Argentina points out that the Court divided the small islands "lying within the Channel" between Navarino and Fuego according to proximity to undisputed territory while
refusing to do so in the case of PNL. The Court rejected division
by appurtenance for PNL on the following grounds:
Since its [the Court's] terms of reference require it to decide in
accordance with international law, a division [of PNL] would have
to be based on a difference of a juridical character between the
situation of one of the islands as compared with that of the other
two. The Court cannot find any such difference.'
The Court then stated that the islands within the Channel were
not attributed under the Treaty since, because they lie in the Beagle Channel, they obviously "cannot lie to the south of it.""' Con113. Treaty of Delimitation, supra note 40, arts. 1, 4.
114. Protocol, supra note 51, art. 2, at 664.
115. An example of historical sources from which contradictory inferences can
be drawn is given by the Court in the Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para.
66, at 662-63 & n.37.
116. The principle plays an important symbolic role in Cardinal Samore's
post-rejection peace formula. THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1979, at 54.
117. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 83, at 666.
118. Id. para. 106, at 672.
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sequently the Court divided the islands by "mixed factors of appurtenance, coastal configuration, equidistance, and also of convenience, navigability, and the desirability of enabling each party
as far as possible to navigate in its own waters." '
Argentina argued that the Treaty phrase "to the south of Beagle
Channel" 120 is no less ambiguous with regard to PNL than it is with
regard to the small islands within the group. According to Argentina, "the Court divide[d] the Beagle Channel, as defined by the
Court itself, into two sections subject to different juridical regimes,
without supplying any justification for it.1 2 1 The Court, however,
provided some justification by concluding that the Treaty's directives ought be measured from the northern arm of the Channel at
its eastern end, thus placing PNL to the south of the Channel. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the Argentine thesis
of a short Channel on the grounds that it would leave PNL unallocated.12 2 Thus the Court was willing to accept a failure of allocation
under the Treaty with regard to the small islands while rejecting
this premise with respect to PNL. Although it could conceivably
make sense to reject the premise for the larger islands and accept
it for the smaller ones on the ground that the negotiators were less
likely to bother with exact division of the latter, the Court should
have clearly articulated its reasoning. Failure to do so set the stage
for Argentina's charge.
Even overlooking the apparent inconsistency, Argentina's shortChannel thesis does not necessarily leave the islands unallocated.
An application of the Argentine thesis of an underlying Atlantic
principle limited to territory not otherwise specifically allocated by
the Treaty would cover PNL. The Court apparently did not consider this possibility,'2 having previously terminated the principle's consideration.1 24 At one point, however, the Court recognized
that the 1893 Protocol lent weight to the principle's existence. The
Court stated that although there is some validity to the principle,
"The Court feels unable to give so wide and general a scope to a
119. Id. para. 110, at 673.
120. Id. para. 3, at 644.
121. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 744.
122. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 81, at 665. It should be noted
that the short-Channel hypothesis does not leave PNL unallocated if an Oceanic
element is accepted as underlying the Treaty.
123

Id.

124. Id. para. 75, at 664.
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phrase that is evidently set in a particular context,-that of the
Andes boundary."' 25
E. Historicaland Geographic Errors
The Court attempted to bolster its conclusion regarding the
eastern Treaty arm of the Beagle Channel by referring to
"confirmatory" cartographical and historical evidence.' Both
Argentina and a member of the Court criticized the use of this
evidence. Judge Andr6 Gros stated in a separate opinion that the
consideration of cartography "was not necessary from the legal
point of view."' 27 Since the Court purported to use this material
only to reinforce conclusions already reached, the inclusion of such
material in the decision seems unwarranted. The Court pointed
out that inferences drawn from historical and geographical sources
are contradictory.'28 Furthermore, the devotion of part II of the
Decision to these materials belies the Court's disclaimer of their
importance. Despite the specific Argentine criticism of the Court's
conclusions regarding these materials, 29 it is clear that the Court
itself laid the groundwork for such criticism.
F. Imbalance and Style
Argentina's complaint of "[i]mbalance in the evaluation of the
argumentation and evidence"' 30 is understandable in light of that
nation's historical feud with the arbitrator over the Falkland Islands. 3 ' Fear of biased arbitration may have been responsible for
32
Argentina's repeated attempts to return to bilateral negotiation.
It was probably at Argentina's insistence that the terms of arbitration were changed to provide for a decision by five members of the
International Court of Justice, subject to ratification by the United
Kingdom, rather than the United Kingdom's unilateral decision. 33
125. Id.
126. Id. para. 101, at 671-72.
127. Id. para. 3, at 675.
128. Id. para. 66, at 662-63 & n.37.
129. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 749-50.
130. Id. at 749.
131. 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 734 (1977).
132. E.g., responding to Chile's request in 1967 for arbitration with a proposal
to bilaterally negotiate the applicability of the arbitration Treaty to the dispute.
Arbitration Report, supra note 7, at 637.
133. Compromiso, supra note 8, at 637-38. The president of the Court of

Arbitration, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, was British. Arbitration Report, supra note

Fall 1979]

BEAGLE CHANNEL AFFAIR

Argentina's dissatisfaction with the arbitration was further exemplified by her denunciation, on March 11, 1972, of the 1902 Treaty
of Arbitration. 34' Argentina's hostility to arbitration made acceptance of an unfavorable decision even less likely.
Beyond its allegation of bias, Argentina attacked the Court's
style. Argentina stated that the Court did not clearly favor Chile's
interpretation, but "merely prefer[ed] it to the Argentinian interpretation, after having weighed up the sum total of their respective
weaknesses."' 5 This criticism, though not literally correct, is nonetheless well-founded, as the following passages demonstrate. After
a consideration of Argentine and Chilean arguments for attribution under Article 2 of the 1881 Treaty, the Court stated as follows:
Normally, the Court would now endeavour to reach a conclusion
about the extent of the Chilean allocation effected by Article II,
considered in itself. But it has been seen that the rival theses are
closely balanced, even if the balance seems to tilt somewhat in
favour of the Chilean view, though perhaps not with complete finality. In these circumstances the Court proposes not to reach any
definite conclusion on the matter at this stage, but to defer it, and
return to it if necessary when other aspects of the case have been
examined. 3'
The Court then considered the question of attribution under the
Islands clause of Article 3. At the outset it was forced to determine
whether a conclusion that PNL fell within the attribution of one
party precluded the necessity for evaluating the other party's attribution. The Court decided that such an evaluation was not precluded, but proceeded with its inquiry only after stating a strong
argument against doing so:
The first preliminary question that arises is whether the Court must
necessarily go into both the sets of attributions effected by the Is-

lands clause-the Argentine and the Chilean,-that is to say
whether, if it should be found that the PNL group falls within one
(i.e. either) of these attributions, it would be necessary also to estab7, at 636, 638. See also Letter by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, THE ECONOMIST, Feb.
17, 1977, at 4.
134. The parties agreed that the renunciation would have no effect on the
Court's proceedings. Declaration of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, supra note
14, at 633. Soon after renunciation Argentina signed a new treaty that provided
for arbitration only by the International Court of Justice. Treaty of Arbitration,
April 5, 1972, Argentina-Chile.
135. Declaration of Nullity, supra note 16, at 749.
136. Arbitration Decision, supra note 12, para. 49, at 654.
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lish that it does not fall within the other. Such a process, which must
of course imply that the group could fall under both attributions,
ought, in principle, to be excluded a priori: . . . since it must be
axiomatic that the negotiators cannot have intended a double attribution of the same islands to both Parties. Thus a definite finding
in the one sense, not only ought to preclude a finding in the other,
but also to act as a bar, in limine, even to the examination of it.
However, the Court does not propose to proceed in that way, if only
because it may not be possible to reach a sufficiently definite conclusion in favour of the one attribution without also considering the
other.'37
The consideration of both sets of attributions did not lead to a
very definite conclusion. With regard to Article 3, the Court concluded that "[T]he Chilean version, although not itself entirely
free from difficulty, is the more normal and natural on the basis
of the actual language of the text."'' 8 To clear up the question left
open about Article 2 attribution, the Court stated that
"[Riecourse to that article is however unnecessary, since it is
clear that independently of it, the PNL group, and the small islands within the Channel, can be attributed under the Islands
clause of Article III ....
It has already been noted that the Court had previously adjudicated that the Treaty did not attribute the small islands within the
Channel.' If it is assumed, however, that the rival theses were
closely balanced and therefore necessitated an independent evaluation of each side's arguments, it was inadvisable for the Court to
stress logical objections to such independent evaluation.'" Once
the decision had been reached, the Court's duty was to articulate
a persuasive opinion. That job was not furthered by highlighting
the understandable hesitation and qualification the Court went
through prior to reaching its decision.
V.

A.

THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

Theoretical Necessity for a Concern with Politics

This Note has presented the argument that the Court of Arbitra-

137. Id. para. 52, at 655.
138. Id. para. 64, at 660.
139. Id. para. 111, at 673.
140. Id. para. 106, at 672.
141. Similarly, the Court's off-hand reference to Chile's occupation of Argentina's claim to disputed islands outside the hammer was not necessary to the
Decision and merely weakened it. Id., at 658, para. 60, at 670, para. 96.
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tion failed, in writing its opinion, to pay sufficient attention to
political realities bearing on compliance with the decision. It may
be objected that a prospective concern on the part of the Court for
the political acceptability of its decisions would be outside the
proper function of the Court. One authority on the International
Court of Justice has argued that the Court's proper function is
to isolate, in the concrete case, the legal problem from the circumstances in which it had its immediate origin, to consider that legal
problem in an objective and even abstract way, and to articulate its
decision on the basis of that examination, to the exclusion of all
political, moral, or other extra-legal considerations.'
After making this statement, the same authority goes on to point
out the fundamental difference between international and domestic law:
It is precisely the absence in the international sphere of any conception of superior sovereignty that distinguishes the functioning of
international tribunals from that of municipal tribunals ....
The judgment of an international tribunal does not, and cannot,
partake of the character of an order from the sovereign to the litigants and to the law-enforcement agencies. There is no international
sovereign concerned to ensure compliance with justice administered
in his name.'
This difference between international and municipal tribunals
provides a sound basis for the proposition that a concern with the
political acceptability of its decisions has added significance for an
international court. International law exists only insofar as states
can be said to act within its confines, and the lack of municipal
coercive power to secure such compliance therefore places a great
burden upon international tribunals to write persuasive opinions.
The Court's failure to meet this burden in the instant case reduced
the likelihood of compliance. Although the decision should not
have been made primarily on a political or other non-legal basis,
the opinion should have been drafted after due consideration of
political reality.
B.

PracticalNecessity for a Concern with Politics

One might object that a prospective concern with compliance
would be misplaced in most cases, since judgments of international
142. S. ROSENNE, supra note 89, at 100.
143.

Id. at 122.
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tribunals are rarely defied.' In response to this issue, it should be
noted that "[t]he fact that there has been statistically a good
record of compliance must be assessed in light of the relatively
unimportant disputes that have been submitted to arbitration or
judicial settlement."'4 5 Perhaps the best known instance of noncompliance in the post-war period, the Corfu Channel Case,' is
also an example of an important dispute taking place in a highly
charged political atmosphere. On October 22, 1946, British warships struck mines while passing through Albanian territorial waters in the straits between Albania and Italy. Many British sailors
lost their lives. Albania, which had adopted a Communist government just after the war, knew of the mines but had failed to warn
the British ships. The United Kingdom sued in the International
Court of Justice for damages, and the Court granted the claim on
December 15, 1949. Albania offered $40,000 in settlement of the
judgment, but Britain refused it on the ground it was insufficient.
The United Kingdom then attempted to attach Albanian property
in Britain, but none was found. Subsequent British efforts to collect the judgment have been unsuccessful, and it remains un4
paid. '
The instant dispute, like Corfu, is "primarily a manifestation or
symbol of a more generalized conflict between the parties so that
acceptance of an adverse decision is not likely to be dissociated
from the underlying tension."'' The Cold War was the underlying
strain in Corfu. In the instant case the tension underlying the
dispute was the national prestige tied up in longstanding claims
to possession of coastlines. In such cases it behooves the Court to
be sensitive to "political, moral, or other extra-legal considerations"'' 0 in expressing its opinion. The Court of Arbitration in the
instant case was not entirely insensitive to these considerations,
but it nonetheless failed to deal with them effectively. A better
opinion might not have guaranteed implementation, but certainly
would have reduced the likelihood of outright rejection.
144. H. KELSEN, supra note 84, at 545 n.118; Schachter, supra note 81, at 2
n.3, 5 n.12.
145. Schachter, supra note 81, at 5.

146. [19491 I.C.J. 4.
147. Id.; E. DEUTSCH, supra note 89, at 268-70.
148. Schachter, supra note 81, at 5.
149. S. ROSENNE, supra note 89, at 100.

Fall 1979]

BEAGLE CHANNEL AFFAIR

VI.

COMPARISON OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL ARBITRATION WITH
HONDURAS V. NICARAGUA

A.

Context of Honduras v. Nicaragua

The setting of the instant decision is somewhat similar to Case
Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23
December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua).'" On October 7, 1894,
Nicaragua and Honduras signed the Gamez-Bonilla Treaty, 5 '
which established a mixed commission to settle a longstanding
boundary dispute. The Treaty provided that it would "be in force
for a period of ten years, in case its execution should be interrupted.'5 2In addition, the Treaty provided a specific procedure to

be followed for the appointment of an arbitrator to decide disputes
not resolved by the mixed commission.'53 The exchange of ratifications took place on December 24, 1896.'14 On July 4, 1901, the
commission noted its disagreement over the appropriate boundary.' 5 On October 2, 1904, the two national members of the mixed
commission agreed by "common consent" that the provisions for
selecting an arbitrator had been complied with and that the King
of Spain would be requested to decide the question.'56 The King of
Spain consented on October 17, 1904.'11 On December 23, 1906, the
regent rendered his decision, which was generally favorable to the
Honduran position.' 8 Both parties appeared to accept the decision
at that time.'59 In 1912, however, Nicaragua challenged its validity.
Nicaragua claimed that the failure to comply with the specific
steps set out in the Treaty for the selection of an arbitrator, as well
as defects in the award itself, rendered the award a nullity.'60 Various attempts at mediation failed.'"' In 1957 the Organization of
American States procured the parties' agreement to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice.' 2 Honduras argued be150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

[1960] I.C.J. 192.
Id. at 199-202.
Gamez-Bonilla Treaty, art. 11, reprinted in [1960] I.C.J. at 202.
Id. arts. 3, 5, reprinted in [1960] I.C.J. at 200-01.
[1960] I.C.J. at 208.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 194. The decision is reprinted in part in [1960] I.C.J. at 202-03.
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id. at 194, 203.
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fore the International Court of Justice that the award was valid
and that Nicaragua was obligated under international law to comply. Nicaragua challenged the appointment of the King of Spain
as arbitrator, asserting that the Gamez-Bonilla Treaty expired before his appointment and that the procedures used to appoint him
violated the Treaty. 63' Nicaragua further attacked the validity of
the award itself because the award allegedly contained "essential
errors," lacked support by an adequate statement of reasons, was
rendered by an arbitrator who exceeded his jurisdiction and con' For purtained "omissions, contradictions and obscurities."164
poses of deciding this case two ad hoc judges, one nominated by
each of the parties, joined the thirteen-man International Court of
Justice.' 5 The Court decided by fourteen votes to one that the
award was valid.'63 Specifically, the Court held that the Treaty had
come into force upon the exchange of ratifications, not upon signing, and therefore ten years had not expired when the King of
Spain was appointed.' 7 With regard to procedural requirements,
the Court held that the expression of common consent to the appointment of the King of Spain vitiated any later objection.'," Concerning the other four grounds, the Court held that Nicaragua's
acquiesence precluded such complaints.6 9 Nicaragua complied
70
with the decision.'

B. Style of the Honduras Court
Since the members of the Beagle Court were all members of the
International Court of Justice, their style can be aptly compared
with that of the Honduras Court. Concerning preclusion, the
Honduras Court stated:
In the judgment of the Court, Nicaragua, by express declaration and
by conduct, recognized the Award as valid and it is no longer open
to Nicaragua to go back upon that recognition and to challenge the
validity of the Award. Nicaragua's failure to raise any question with
regard to the validity of the Award, for several years after the full
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 205.
Id.at 210.
Id.at 194-95.
Id.at 217.
Id.at 209.
Id.at 207.
Id.at 213.
See S. ROSENNE, supra note 89, at 121; J. GAMBLE & D.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 48-49

(1976).

FISCHER, THE
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terms of the Award had become known to it further confirms the
7
conclusion at which the Court has arrived.' '
The style in Honduras is more forceful than the conclusionary
paragraphs of the Beagle opinion. There is no outward hesitation
in the Court's language. Other examples from which a comparison
can be made will appear in the bourse of examining the Court's
rationale regarding nullity on the merits."'
C.

Rationale of Honduras on the Nullity Question

The Honduras Court's position regarding Nicaragua's claims of
nullity on the merits gives some indication of the validity of Argentina's Declaration of Nullity.1 3 In both cases the parties claim
excess of power or jurisdiction, essential errors of history and geography, and inadequate reasoning. Nicaragua argued that the King
of Spain exceeded his jurisdiction by deciding the case without
proper reliance on the rules of historical and geographical interpretation laid down in Article 2 of the Gamez-Bonilla Treaty.' In
considering this claim, the Court described its function as follows:
[T]he Award is not subject to appeal and ... the Court cannot
approach the consideration of the objections raised by Nicaragua to
the validity of the Award as a Court of Appeal. The Court is not
called upon to pronounce on whether the arbitrator's decision was
right or wrong. These and cognate considerations have no relevance
to the function that the Court is called upon to discharge in these
proceedings, which is to decide whether the Award is proved to be
a nullity having no effect.'
The Court refused to second guess the arbitrator's award on the
merits, contrary to Nicaragua's request. Argentina appears to
demand a similar second guess in the instant case. Also, the Court
held that the arbitrator's award had been "based on historical and
legal consideration (derecho historic6) in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article II" and therefore was not a nullity., The
Court likewise failed to find the "essential error" ground valid:
171. [1960] I.C.J. 213.
172. One judge suggested that the Court should have based its conclusion
entirely on grounds of preclusion. Id. at 219-20 (separate opinion of Judge
Spender). Another judge suggested that preclusion was insufficient. Id., at 21718 (separate opinion of Judge Quintana).
173. Se' id. at 214-17.
174. Id. at 214-15. See also Gamez-Bonilla Treaty, id. at 199-200.
175. Id. at 214.
176. Id. at 215.
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The instances of 'essential error' that Nicaragua has brought to the
attention of the Court amount to no more than evaluation of documents and of other evidence submitted to the arbitrator. The appraisal of the probative value of documents and evidence appertained to the discretionary power of the arbitrator is not open to
question. 7
This same argument could be made concerning Argentina's contention regarding historical, geographical, and interpretive errors
in the Beagle Arbitration. If the Hondurasdecision is godd precedent on the question of nullity, then Argentina's arguments do not
appear to be convincing.
VII.

COMPARISON OF BEAGLE ARBTRATION wrrH CARDINAL
SAMORi'S MEDIATION

A.

Punctuality

Not only does the Beagle decision fare poorly in comparison with
another international tribunal's decision in a somewhat similar
case, it also compares unfavorably with another party's mediation
in the same controversy. The long delay in rendering the Beagle
decision is highlighted when compared to the punctuality of Cardinal Samor6's arbitration. Although Cardinal Samore undoubtedly
had the advantage of the parties' post-Award confrontation, their
Roman Catholicism, and the high tension of the moment, he constructed an acceptable peace formula within three weeks as opposed to the Court's six year time period. The Cardinal's punctuality also compares favorably with the usual time necessary for the
International Court of Justice to decide a contentious case. One
study reveals that in most cases the International Court of Justice
has delivered a decision within three years.7 The decision in
Honduras v. Nicaragua took only two years and four months. 7 '
In Beagle, the first request for arbitration was made in 1967, and
a Compromiso was agreed upon in 1971. After five years of preliminaries,' oral argument commenced in September, 1976. The
177. Id. at 215-16.
178. J. GAMBLE & D.

FISCHER, supra note

170, at 68-69.

179. Id. at 58.59.
180. On June 10, 1972, the Court established its seat at Geneva. It set a
deadline for submission of memorials by January 1, 1973, and then extended it

to July 2, 1973. The Court set a deadline for counter-memorials at July 2, 1974,
and later extended it to October 2, 1974. Another nine months was allowed for
reply briefs, and nine months after that, in March 1976, the Court visited the
scene of the dispute. Arbitration Report, supra note 7, at 637, 641-43.
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Court began deliberating in October, 1976, and announced its decision on February 18, 1977.181 Thus, it would appear that interna-

tional arbitration can be so lengthy that it is of no use in the case
of a heated dispute.
B. Sensitivity to Symbolism
Punctuality is not the only respect in which Cardinal Samor6's
mediation proved superior to the Court's arbitration. Unlike the
Court, the Cardinal grasped the symbolic importance and facesaving potential of the Oceanic principle. Although his peace formula, like the Court's gives Chile rights to PNL, it assuaged Argentina's fear of interference with sea routes by declaring that the
Channel itself should be demilitarised and binational. Furthermore, Chile agreed to accept the Oceanic principle, and in consequence agreed to accept both a twelve mile maritime boundary
around PNL 82 and an Argentine presence on "enclaves on nearby
islets and on Cape Horn."'' Chile's apparent willingness to accept
the Oceanic principle on these terms belies the Court's conclusion
that no such principle exists.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

It has been demonstrated that although the Argentine Declaration of Nullity does not contain valid legal arguments for rejection,
it does indicate weaknesses in the Court's opinion that make it
vulnerable to rejection for political reasons. Specifically, the
Court's remarks about Chilean possession of disputed islands outside the hammer were especially ill-advised. In addition, the Court
failed to clearly articulate the reason for dividing the small Channel islands by appurtenance while refusing to do so for PNL. Finally, the Court's refusal to apply an Oceanic principle, even in a
narrow sense, was questionable in a case in which the legal arguments based upon the Treaty text were closely balanced. The
Court's lack of power to decide "ex aequo et bono" did not prevent
a broad interpretation of the Treaty to include some version of the
Oceanic principle. Although the Court's refusal to apply the
Oceanic principle was logically defensible, its broadside discrediting of the principle was not. The Court's adverse findings were
181.

Id.

182. This compares with the 200 mile limit declared on July 14, 1977. See note
20 and accompanying text, supra.
183. THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1979, at 54.
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made even more unacceptable to Argentina by virtue of such flaws
in style. If the members of the International Court of Justice are
to play a more important role in resolving future heated international disputes, they will have to speed up the procedure of the
bodies on which they serve, improve their judicial style, and pay
more attention to the symbolism of international politics.
David M. Himmelreich

